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In this study, we examine the determinants of human resource investment in internal controls. Internal
control systems, which are vital to the continual existence of a ﬁrm, consist of measures implemented by a ﬁrm
aimed at achieving purposes that include, but not limited to, safeguarding of assets and resources, deterring
and detecting errors and fraud, ensuring accuracy and completeness of accounting data, and producing
reliable and relevant ﬁnancial information. Among the procedures and policies for internal control systems,
internal controls over ﬁnancial reporting are deﬁned as a process designed to “provide reasonable assurancection and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of China Journal of Accounting Research.
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poses” (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), 2004).1 A good control environment has
the potential to enhance the quality of ﬁnancial reports, and thus, is considered an important feature of a ﬁrm
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008).
In an eﬀort to improve the reliability of ﬁnancial reporting, the US Congress enacted the Sarbanes–Oxley
Act (SOX) in 2002 to improve ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial reporting practice. Section 302 of SOX requires management to
indicate any signiﬁcant changes in internal controls, while Section 404 of SOX enforces ﬁrms to assess the
design and operating eﬀectiveness, and auditors to certify the eﬀectiveness of internal controls over ﬁnancial
reporting (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2002, 2003). In response to the wave of ﬁnancial reporting
reforms, Korea also adopted several new regulations. First, the “Act on External Audit of Stock Companies”
(the “External Audit Act”), which includes the regulation on the mandatory audit for the ﬁrms over a certain
size, was signiﬁcantly amended to improve the ﬁnancial reporting environment in Korea. Speciﬁcally, the Act
requires CEOs and CFOs of a ﬁrm to oversee and report on the operation and eﬀectiveness of the internal
control system to the board of directors. It also requires external auditors to evaluate the assessment by man-
agement on the internal control system and express their review opinion on the system. Importantly, the
Financial Supervisory Service (the equivalent of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the US) issued
a guideline in 2002 which requires every listed ﬁrm to disclose its total number of personnel who are in charge
of internal control-related tasks (hereafter IC personnel) and the number of IC personnel by department. The
requirement is the ﬁrst in the world with no other countries having adopted a similar disclosure requirement.
We use a hand-collected sample of Korean companies that disclosed the number of IC personnel from 2005 to
2008 to investigate factors which aﬀect the human resource investment in internal controls. We deﬁne the
number of IC personnel as a proxy for the investment in the internal control system.
Our results indicate that ﬁrms with a relatively high number of IC personnel are positively associated with (1)
ﬁrm size, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets; (2) the number of employees, measured by the nat-
ural logarithm of the number of employees; (3) ﬁnancial reporting complexity, as measured by assets denomi-
nated in foreign currencies deﬂated by total assets; and (4) whether a ﬁrm is a Chaebol ﬁrm or not.2 However, the
number of IC personnel is negatively associated with ﬁrm growth, measured by sales growth from year t  1 to t.
Furthermore, such relations are found to be pronounced among larger ﬁrms. These ﬁrm characteristics incen-
tivize management to build and maintain a strong internal control system by securing suﬃcient IC personnel,
which reduce problems related to the segregation of duties, inadequate staﬃng and supervision problems.
Since the implementation of Sections 302 and 404, there are a large number of studies investigating the area of
internal controls. One line of studies on internal controls documents the positive reporting eﬀects of high quality
internal control systems. Doyle et al. (2007b) and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) suggest that eﬀective internal
controls, measured by the non-existence of internal control weaknesses, increase ﬁnancial reporting quality,
proxied by accruals quality and the size of abnormal accruals, respectively. Furthermore, Ashbaugh-Skaife
et al. (2009) ﬁnd that adequate internal controls reduce information risk, thus lowering the cost of equity. Sim-
ilar results are reported using the data on IC personnel in Korea. Choi et al. (2013) ﬁnd that the proportion of IC
personnel within the ﬁrm is negatively associated with the likelihood that the ﬁrm has internal control weak-
nesses. Lee et al. (2010) investigate the relation between IC personnel and audit fees and suggest that the high
quality audit demanded by companies with larger investments in internal controls leads to higher audit fees.
Related to this study, prior research has identiﬁed the determinants of internal control weaknesses, arguing
that ﬁrms with material weaknesses tend to be less proﬁtable, smaller, younger, more complex, growing rap-
idly or undergoing restructuring (e.g., Ge and McVay, 2005; Krishnan, 2005; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007;1 Speciﬁcally, the objective of the policies and procedures related to internal controls of a company are threefold: it aims “(1) to maintain
records that accurately and fairly reﬂect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the company, (2) to provide reasonable assurance
that transactions are recorded in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and that receipts and expenditures of the
company are being made only in accordance with authorizations of management and directors of the company; and (3) to provide
reasonable assurance regarding prevention or timely detection of unauthorized acquisition, use or disposition of the company’s assets that
could have a material eﬀect on the ﬁnancial statements” (PCAOB, 2004).
2 Business conglomerates (group of ﬁrms) owned by founding families are called Chaebols in Korea. Chaebol ﬁrms dominate the Korean
economy (Kim and Yi, 2006; Kwon et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2012).
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cussed above, complement and corroborate the ﬁndings of prior studies. We diﬀer from prior literature in that
we investigate the drivers for relatively high investment in human resource in internal controls, rather than the
determinants of ﬁrms with material weaknesses. In so doing, we provide insight on the type of corporate envi-
ronment that induces ﬁrms to make investments in information systems and internal controls. The investment
in IC personnel eventually inﬂuences the strength of internal controls (Choi et al., 2013). In this respect, we
believe that the results based on a unique reporting requirement in Korea oﬀer valuable implications to
stand-setters, practitioners and academics around the world.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the institutional background in
Korea and review prior literature. We develop research hypotheses in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss our
research design and specify our empirical models. Section 5 describes our sample and presents descriptive sta-
tistics. In Section 6, we present our empirical results and perform an additional test. Finally, Section 7 sets
forth our conclusions.
2. The regulatory environment in korea and relevant literature
2.1. Regulatory background in Korea
Before the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2011, Korea used a set of
accounting standards known as K-GAAP (Korean Generally Accepted Accounting Principles), which is sim-
ilar to U.S. GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles). The convergence eﬀorts led Korea to adopt
IFRS beginning in 2011 and allow early adoption of IFRS from 2009. While the regulations and standards in
Korea closely resemble those in developed countries, the enforcement system is not as strong (Choi et al.,
2013). A distinctive feature of the Korean economy is that the inﬂuence of Chaebols, which are Korean busi-
ness conglomerates, is substantial (Kim and Yi, 2006; Kwon et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2012). Total assets of the
200 largest companies, most of which are Chaebols, in Korea increased from 84.1% to 101.2% of Gross
Domestic Product, and sales increased from 70.5% to 86.5% over the decade from 1991 to 2001 (Solidarity
for Economic Reform, 2010). Given the important role of Chaebols in Korea, their survival is vital for the
continued growth of the Korean economy.
Before the passage of SOX, the regulations on internal controls of ﬁrms were virtually non-existent in
Korea (Kim et al., 2007; Kim, 2009; Choi et al., 2013). In response to the series of worldwide corporate scan-
dals in 2002, the Financial Supervisory Service announced action plans to improve transparency of the
accounting standards and systems in Korea. A series of plans was mandated into law and is referred to as
K-SOX (Choi et al., 2013). Similar to SOX, the reform requires certiﬁcation by CEOs and CFOs of the reli-
ability of the ﬁnancial reports, a mandatory rotation of auditors every 6 years and prohibits provision of cer-
tain non-audit services by incumbent auditors. It also enacted a Securities Class Action Suit Law, which
increases the legal liability of ﬁrms, management and auditors with respect to ﬁnancial reporting. Addition-
ally, the plan enhanced the transparency of internal control systems by strengthening the unclear set of reg-
ulations that existed on internal control systems (Shin, 2007).
The ﬁrst wave of changes in regulations was implemented through amendments in the “External Audit
Act”. It governs the rules on external auditing and was amended in December 2003 to include regulations
on internal control systems. Speciﬁcally, Article 2-2 of the External Audit Act requires that any company with
total assets over 7 billion Korean Won (approximately US$6 million) maintain rules and procedures on inter-
nal controls and implement adequate internal control systems. It sets forth the responsibilities of CEOs and
CFOs to create and oversee their ﬁrm’s internal control system and designates one of the directors to be in
charge of the operation of the internal control system. This designated director is required to report on the
operation of the internal control system to the board of directors and the statutory auditor or an audit com-
mittee on a semi-annual basis.3 The statutory auditor or an audit committee should evaluate the eﬀectiveness3 The role of a statutory auditor in Korea is to supervise the board of directors. It is required for large public companies of which total
assets are over 2 trillion Korean Won ($1.7 billion) to create an audit committee. The rule states that a public company can have either at
least one full-time statutory auditor or an audit committee comprised of at least three board members.
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Article 2-3 of the External Audit Act deﬁnes the responsibilities of external auditors related to internal con-
trols. External auditors are required to evaluate management’s report on the assessment of internal controls
and express their review opinions. The diﬀerence between SOX Section 404 and related K-SOX regulation in
article 2-3 of the External Audit Act is that Section 404(b) requires auditors’ attestation while the Korean
counterpart requires auditors’ review opinion, which provides a lower level of assurance than an audit
(Kim et al., 2007; Shin, 2007; Kim, 2009; Choi et al., 2013).
Secondly, the Operating Committee of Internal Control over Financial Reporting in Korea, which is a
committee of the Korea Listed Companies Association, issued the Best Practice Guideline for Internal Control
over Financial Reporting (the “Guideline”) in June 2005 to reform the accounting system in Korea. The guide-
line, which is similar to the U.S. Committee of Sponsoring Organization’s (COSO, 1992) framework, provides
an integrated framework for Korean companies to design and operate an eﬀective internal control system and
to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the system (Choi et al., 2013). Accordingly, in 2005, the Korean Institute of
Certiﬁed Public Accountants issued the “Standard of Review of Internal Control Systems”, which is similar
to PCAOB’s (2004) Auditing Standard No. 2 in the US, although the level of assurance is slightly lower in
Korea (Choi et al., 2013).
The Financial Supervisory Service issued guidelines in 2002 on disclosures related to internal control sys-
tems which require every listed ﬁrm to report its total number of IC personnel and the number of IC personnel
by department (accounting department, audit committee, board of directors, ﬁnance department, information
technology and system (ITS) and “other”4 departments). Additionally, the guidelines mandate the disclosure
of the number of certiﬁed public accountants (CPAs) in each department and the average length of experience
of the IC personnel. These data are disclosed in the “Report on the operation of internal control systems” as a
part of a ﬁrm’s annual report and an example of the disclosure on IC personnel is presented in the Appendix
for reference. Overall, regulations on internal controls in Korea are similar to those in the US although the
level of enforcement may be slightly weaker.2.2. Prior literature
After the data on internal controls became available upon the enactment of Sections 302 and 404 of SOX,
voluminous studies on internal controls have emerged. One strand of research investigates the eﬀect of internal
control weaknesses on the capital market. Beneish et al. (2008) and Ogneva et al. (2007) document the adverse
stock price reaction to the disclosure of internal control weaknesses. Additionally, Hammersley et al. (2008)
report that the adverse consequences of disclosure of material weaknesses depend on the severity of internal
control weaknesses.
Another strand of research investigates whether the quality of internal controls aﬀects ﬁnancial reporting
quality. Doyle et al. (2007b) document a negative relationship between accruals quality and ICWs ﬁled under
Section 302. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) suggest that earnings quality improves following the remediation of
internal control weaknesses reported under both Sections 302 and 404. Korean studies by Shin (2007) and Lee
et al. (2007) report similar ﬁndings. Furthermore, Feng et al. (2009) examine the relation between internal con-
trols and the accuracy of management guidance and conclude that internal control quality leads to fewer
errors in internal management reports. Other studies argue that internal control systems can be inﬂuenced
by the monitoring mechanisms in place, such as an independent board of directors or audit eﬀort (Krishnan,
2005; Hogan and Wilkins, 2008), with weak monitoring mechanisms resulting in internal control weaknesses.
There are two studies which use the data on IC personnel in Korea. Choi et al. (2013) investigate the eﬀect
of the quality of internal control systems on internal control weaknesses and show that the proportion of IC
personnel is inversely related to the existence of internal control weaknesses, both at the ﬁrm and department
levels. This ﬁnding is in line with Ge and McVay (2005), who conclude that poor internal controls can be
attributed to the lack of qualiﬁed accounting personnel. The second study that uses the IC personnel data4 “Other” pertains to the diﬀerent departments that are related to internal control tasks, not all other departments existing in the ﬁrm.
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relationship between IC personnel and audit fees. The ﬁndings suggest that ﬁrms with a higher number of IC
personnel require a more thorough audit. As a result, auditors increase their eﬀort level (i.e., increase audit
hours), which is reﬂected in higher audit fees.
The strand of literature for which our work is relevant is the literature that identiﬁes the determinants of
internal control weaknesses. Using data from the pre-SOX period, Krishnan (2005) examines internal control
deﬁciencies, which consist of both signiﬁcant deﬁciencies and those not classiﬁed as material weaknesses, for
the period 1994–2000. She investigates the characteristics of material weakness ﬁrms, focusing on the eﬀect of
the quality of monitoring systems (e.g., board of directors, audit committees) on internal control weaknesses.
Ge and McVay (2005) document that ﬁrms with material weaknesses are relatively more complex, smaller and
less proﬁtable, compared to ﬁrms without material weaknesses. Doyle et al. (2007a) ﬁnd results similar to
those in Ge and McVay (2005) but include additional variables such as ﬁrm age, extreme sales growth and
restructuring charge. Doyle et al. (2007a) add to the literature by suggesting that ﬁrms disclosing material
weaknesses tend to be younger, growth ﬁrms and undergoing restructuring. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) par-
tially conﬁrm the ﬁndings in Doyle et al. (2007a) by documenting that ﬁrms with internal control weaknesses
are more complex and add that such ﬁrms have recent changes in organizational structure, more accounting
risk exposure, and fewer resources to invest in internal controls.
This paper corroborates prior ﬁndings in this line of literature by analyzing the types of ﬁrms that hire suf-
ﬁcient personnel in internal control-related departments. Firms with a relatively high number of IC personnel
are likely to have fewer deﬁciencies in the ﬁnancial reporting process, segregation of duties problems and inap-
propriate account reconciliation caused by the lack of qualiﬁed accounting personnel (Choi et al., 2013). Com-
pared with most prior studies, we present a much more balanced analysis on the characteristics of ﬁrms with
varying levels of internal control strength because the data used in this study allows us to make comparisons
across all companies regardless of whether or not they report an internal control weakness. In contrast, most
prior studies focus on the diﬀerence between ﬁrms with internal control weaknesses and other ﬁrms without
weaknesses, thereby treating all ﬁrms not reporting internal control weaknesses (more than 95% in most anal-
yses) as being equal.5 Thus, the results of our study oﬀer a more general picture of the types of ﬁrms that strive
for high quality internal control systems.
3. Hypotheses development
In this section, we investigate the speciﬁc characteristics that are associated with ﬁrms that have a relatively
high number of IC personnel. Based on the guidance and results from prior research, we explore eight aspects:
size, business complexity, age, ﬁnancial distress, growth, business group, corporate governance and the type of
exchange market. We present predictions on the directional relationships between IC personnel and factors
that determine IC personnel in Table 1.
Firstly, literature shows conﬂicting evidence on the eﬀect of size on internal control quality. Krishnan
(2005) ﬁnds a negative relationship between ﬁrm size and quality of controls. In contrast, studies investigating
the factors that are important in determining the likelihood that a ﬁrm will disclose an internal control deﬁ-
ciency generally ﬁnd a positive association between ﬁrm size and the quality of internal controls (Ge and
McVay, 2005; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007; Doyle et al., 2007a). Though the evidence is mixed, intuition sug-
gests that large ﬁrms have the resources to invest in hiring more qualiﬁed internal control personnel which will
ensure adequate policies and procedures to be in place. Beasley, (1996), who focus on the cases of ﬁnancial
statement fraud, document a negative relationship between ﬁrm size and incidence of fraud. Thus, we expect
to ﬁnd higher quality internal controls for larger ﬁrms. We measure size by the natural logarithm of total
assets (LNASSET) and the natural logarithm of the number of employees within a ﬁrm (LNEMP).
Another factor that likely determines IC personnel is complexity of the ﬁrm. Firms with complex opera-
tions and transactions are more likely to experience internal control problems (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.,5 By focusing on the number of IC personnel, we can look into the ﬁrms without internal control weaknesses and infer how strong the
internal control system of these ﬁrms is. In this respect, we believe that our analyses provide valuable insights over the ﬁndings in prior
studies.
Table 1
Variable deﬁnitions and expected relationships with IC personnel.
Variable Predicted sign Deﬁnition
LNASSET + The natural logarithm of total assets
LNEMP + The natural logarithm of one plus the number of employees within the ﬁrm
RD + R&D expenses deﬂated by sales in year t
EXPORT + Exports/sales in year t
FOR_fCURR + Assets denominated in foreign currencies/total assets in year t
LNPROD + The natural logarithm of one plus the number of products the ﬁrm produces
INV_AR + Inventory plus accounts receivable divided by total assets in year t
LNAGE + The natural logarithm of one plus the age of the ﬁrm in years from the date of establishment
LEVERAGE – Total liabilities in year t divided by total assets in year t
ZSCORE – Decile rank of Altman’s (1968) z-score
LOSS – Indicator variable that takes the value of one if the ﬁrm reports a loss for the year, and zero otherwise
GROWTH – Change in sales deﬂated by total assets in year t  1
CHAEBOL + Indicator variable that takes the value of one if the ﬁrm is aﬃliated with a business group, Chaebol
LARGEST ± The natural logarithm of one plus the ownership of the largest shareholder
FOROWN ± The natural logarithm of one plus the ownership of foreign investors
KOSDAQ ± Indicator variable that takes the value of one if the ﬁrm is listed on KOSDAQ, and zero otherwise
This table provides a summary of the variable measurements and each of our directional predictions.
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internal control systems to prevent deﬁciencies in internal controls. For example, a multinational ﬁrm which
has branches in various locations is aﬀected by the diﬀerent legal and institutional environments in each coun-
try, making it more diﬃcult to structure adequate internal control systems. Also, ﬁrms with many distinct
product lines, relative to ﬁrms with a single product line, need to implement policies and procedures separately
for each product line, thus aﬀecting eﬀective internal controls. In summary, we conjecture that ﬁrms with high
levels of complexity will heavily invest in their internal control systems. We measure complexity using ﬁve
proxies including RD, deﬁned as research and development expenses deﬂated by sales in year t; EXPORT,
deﬁned as the ratio of exports to total sales in year t; FOR_CURR, deﬁned as assets denominated in foreign
currencies divided by total assets in year t; LNPROD, deﬁned as the natural logarithm of one plus the number
of products the ﬁrm produces; and INV_AR, deﬁned as the sum of inventory and accounts receivables divided
by total assets in year t.6
Thirdly, the experience of a ﬁrm may be associated with the eﬀectiveness of its internal control system.
Older ﬁrms are likely to have more established processes and procedures in place due to longer experience.
Prior studies suggest that ﬁrms reporting material weaknesses tend to be younger (Ge and McVay, 2005;
Doyle et al., 2007a). In connection to the number of IC personnel, it is likely that older ﬁrms have established
adequate controls in place and are staﬀed with experienced accounting personnel who are capable of achieving
eﬀective internal control systems, thus reducing the need for a higher number of IC personnel. Age is measured
by the natural logarithm of one plus the age of the ﬁrm in years from the date of establishment (LNAGE). We
predict a positive sign for LNAGE.
The fourth determinant of IC personnel is a ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial health. The ability to establish proper internal
control systems may be aﬀected by the performance of ﬁrms. Krishnan (2005) argues that poorly performing
ﬁrms may not be able to invest in adequate internal control systems and reports results consistent with this
argument. Relatedly, Ge and McVay (2005) ﬁnd ﬁrm proﬁtability to be inversely related to ﬁrm disclosure
of maternal weaknesses. Doyle et al. (2007a) conﬁrm the ﬁndings in Ge and McVay (2005) and report that
two ﬁnancial resources measures, the existence of a loss and bankruptcy risk, are positively related to report-
ing an internal control problem. Based on prior ﬁndings, we argue that ﬁnancial distress prevents ﬁrms from
investing in eﬀective internal control systems. Consequently, the lack of suﬃcient time and money in building6 These variables are frequently used in prior studies to represent ﬁrm complexity (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007; Choi et al., 2008,
2013).
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LEVERAGE (total liabilities in year t divided by total assets in year t), ZSCORE (Decile rank of Altman’s
(1968) z-score) and LOSS (whether or not a ﬁrm reports a loss for the year). We expect these proxies for ﬁnan-
cial distress to be negatively related to the number of IC personnel.
Fifth, Krishnan (2005) and Doyle et al. (2007a) suggest that ﬁrms growing too rapidly may outgrow their
existing internal control systems, and thus require additional time and investment to reorganize and revamp
the internal control systems in place. Improvement in internal control systems requires implementation of new
processes, new technology, and most importantly, new personnel. It is likely that rapidly developing ﬁrms lack
such resources, and thus have a small internal control department. In this study, growth of a ﬁrm is measured
by changes in sales deﬂated by total assets in year t  1 (GROWTH).
Sixth, in Korea, a large number of public and private ﬁrms are aﬃliated with business conglomerates,
known as Chaebols, in which founding families have full control over aﬃliated companies (Kim and Yi,
2006; Kwon et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2012). Chaebols are a major determinant of the Korean economy and their
inﬂuence on Korean society is signiﬁcant (Chang and Hong, 2000; Joh, 2003). One stream of literature focuses
on corporate governance and intra-group transactions within Chaebol-aﬃliated ﬁrms. For example, Kim and
Yi (2006) raise the possibility that business group aﬃliation engenders severe agency problems. The complex
structure of business groups makes it diﬃcult for outsiders to monitor self-dealing transactions, and thus
Chaebol-aﬃliation ﬁrms have greater opportunities and incentives to divert ﬁrm resources through tunneling
at the expense of minority shareholders. Another strand of literature analyzes the characteristics of Chaebol
ﬁrms. Kim and Berger (2009) report that Chaebol ﬁrms are larger in size, have higher sales growth rates, lower
proﬁtability and lower business risk. Challenging the research methodology adopted by Kim and Berger
(2009) and Kim (2012) presents diﬀerent results for analyses of Chaebol-aﬃliated ﬁrms, using a more reﬁned
research design by employing the matching estimator technique. Kim (2012) examines the value implication of
business groups in Korea and ﬁnds Chaebol-aﬃliated ﬁrms, over time, tend to be larger, more proﬁtable, grow
faster with more investments, and enjoy beneﬁts from tax shields and monitoring eﬀects. In summary, prior
studies on the characteristics of Chaebols provide general evidence that Chaebol-aﬃliated ﬁrms tend to be lar-
ger in size, more proﬁtable and have the capacity to make larger investments, enabling them to prosper for a
long period of time. While we acknowledge that the negative eﬀects (e.g., tunneling activities, agency prob-
lems) of Chaebols may lead to deteriorating internal control systems, we argue that the greater resources
and capacity of Chaebols will have a positive eﬀect on investments in human resources in internal controls.
We include an indicator variable, CHAEBOL, to identify Chaebol-aﬃliated ﬁrms.
Finally, corporate governance mechanisms may play an important role in the internal control systems of
ﬁrms. There is mixed evidence on the association between the quality of corporate governance and internal
control systems. Krishnan (2005) examines the relation between audit committee quality and the quality of
internal controls. She ﬁnds that ﬁrms with more independent audit committees and audit committees with
ﬁnancial expertise are inversely associated with the existence of internal control problems. Doyle et al.
(2007a) posit that ﬁrms with good corporate governance mechanisms exhibit fewer material weaknesses. How-
ever, they do not ﬁnd the quality of governance to be signiﬁcantly related to disclosing a material weakness.
The inconsistent results may be explained by the substitutive role of internal control systems. For example,
high quality audits by external auditors may alleviate the adverse consequences of material weaknesses
(Hogan and Wilkins, 2008). We measure the level of corporate governance by two measures, LARGEST
(the natural logarithm of one plus the ownership of the largest shareholder) and FOROWN (the natural log-
arithm of one plus the ownership of foreign investors). Concentrated ownership gives owners better incentives
to monitor ﬁrms and make necessary changes in management (La Porta et al., 1999). By contrast, in ﬁrms with
diﬀuse ownership, no single owner has an incentive to “mind the store,” so management is not disciplined for
bad performance or rewarded for good performance, leading to poor oversight of management. Therefore,
ﬁrms with high ownership of the largest shareholder will be better governed. Similarly, ﬁrms with high levels
of foreign investor ownership will be under enhanced monitoring (Guedhami et al., 2009). Thus, high levels of
LARGEST and FOROWN are consistent with high quality corporate governance structures. As the substitu-
tive role of internal control systems suggests, the low level of corporate governance may be alleviated by high
quality internal control systems (e.g., Choi and Wong, 2007), resulting in an inverse relationship between cor-
porate governance and IC personnel. We do not predict a sign for LARGEST and FOROWN. Finally, we
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ences in ﬁrms listed on diﬀerent stock exchanges.7
4. Model speciﬁcation and test procedures
4.1. Determinants of human resource investment in internal controls
To investigate the determinants of human resources in internal controls, we model IC personnel as a func-









10 ThIC PERt ¼ b0 þ b1LNASSET t þ b2LNEMPt þ b3RDt þ b4EXPORT t þ b5FOR CURRt þ b6LNPRODt
þ b7INV ARt þ b8LNAGEt þ b9LEVERAGEt þ b10ZSCOREt þ b11LOSSt þ b12GROWTHt
þ b13CHAEBOLt þ b14LARGEST t þ b15FOROWNt þ b16KOSDAQt þ Industry Fixed effects
þ Year Fixed effectsþ et ð1Þwhere t indexes the year and IC_PER is either IC_TOTAL1, IC_TOTAL2, IC_ACC, IC_FIN, IC_ACCFIN or
IC_IT. IC_TOTAL1 is the natural logarithm of the sum of the number of personnel in the internal control
department (namely, IC personnel) for accounting, ﬁnance, ITS and other departments in the ﬁrm.8 IC_TO-
TAL2 is the natural logarithm of the sum of the number of personnel in the internal control department for
accounting, ﬁnance and ITS departments in the ﬁrm. IC_ACC, IC_FIN, IC_ACCFIN and IC_IT are the
natural logarithm of the IC personnel for accounting, ﬁnance, accounting and ﬁnance combined, and ITS
departments in the ﬁrm, respectively.9 All other variables are as deﬁned in Table 1. We include industry
and year indicator variables to control for industry ﬁxed eﬀects and year ﬁxed eﬀects. We adjust standard er-
rors for heteroscedasticity and ﬁrm-level clustering. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% values.
4.2. The Eﬀect of Firm Size on the Determinants of Human Resource Investment in Internal Controls
As a further test to understand ﬁrms’ characteristics that inﬂuence the quality of internal controls, we exam-
ine under which situations the importance of determinants has an accentuated eﬀect on IC personnel. Prior
studies on the area of internal control systems generally suggest that smaller ﬁrms have weaker internal con-
trols due to the lack of resources and infrastructure. Size, as one of the most critical factors which inﬂuence the
internal control system of a ﬁrm, represents ﬁrms’ ability and capacity to invest in information systems and
internal controls. We divide the sample into two sub-samples by the median value of LNASSET, the natural
logarithm of total assets.10 We investigate whether the determinants have a larger eﬀect on IC personnel for
ﬁrms with relatively larger size. To examine the eﬀect of relatively large ﬁrm size on the relation observed in
Eq. (1), we use the following multivariate regression model:IC PERt ¼ b0 þ b1DETERMINANTSt þ b2LARGEt þ b18LARGEt  DETERMINANTSt
þ Industry Fixed effectsþ Year Fixed effectsþ et ð2Þwhere t indexes the year and IC_PER is ether IC_TOTAL1, IC_TOTAL2, IC_ACC, IC_FIN, IC_ACCFIN or
IC_IT. In the regression model, we include a variable namedDETERMINANTS to convey the sixteen variablese variable has a value of 1 if a ﬁrm is listed on the KOSDAQ market, and 0 otherwise. Firms listed on the KOSDAQ are less subject
ernment regulations than ﬁrms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE), which is the major exchange in Korea.
use the logged value instead of the raw value to remove the undue inﬂuence of a few outliers.
reported in the Appendix, Korean ﬁrms are required to disclose IC personnel on the audit committee, board of directors,
ting, ﬁnance, ITS and other departments separately. Following Choi et al. (2013), we do not include the number of IC personnel
g on the audit committee and the board in our analyses because there is almost no variation in the number of IC personnel in these
partments. Most of the sample ﬁrms employ 1 or 2 IC personnel in these two departments. In addition, we decide to combine
ting and ﬁnance departments to generate IC_ACCFIN because some ﬁrms do not separate these two departments.
e results using LNEMP, another proxy for the ﬁrm size, is qualitatively identical and thus not separately reported.
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LEVERAGE, ZSCORE, LOSS, GROWTH, CHAEBOL, LARGEST, FOROWN, KOSDAQ. To capture dif-
ferences in ﬁrm size, we include the variable LARGE, an indicator variable which equals one if the size of the
ﬁrm is greater than the median ﬁrm size and zero otherwise. Interactions with LARGE and the sixteen factors
that are known to inﬂuence the number of IC personnel (DETERMINANTS) are included. Speciﬁc deﬁnitions
of the variables are provided in Tables 1 and 2. For all regressions, we report t-statistics that are adjusted using
standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and ﬁrm-level clustering. All variables are winsorized at 1%Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std. Dev.
Panel A: Number of IC personnel in each department
IC_N_TOTAL1 10.676 4 7 11 22.637
IC_N_TOTAL2 9.059 4 6 9 16.920
IC_N_ACC 4.820 2 3 5 12.030
IC_N_FIN 2.146 1 1 3 2.813
IC_N_ACCFIN 6.966 3 5 7 13.856
IC_N_IT 2.093 1 1 2 7.484
Panel B: The natural logarithm of the number of IC personnel in each department
IC_TOTAL1 2.150 1.609 2.079 2.485 0.635
IC_TOTAL2 2.026 1.609 1.946 2.303 0.620
IC_ACC 1.472 1.099 1.386 1.792 0.611
IC_FIN 0.937 0.693 0.693 1.386 0.603
IC_ACCFIN 1.806 1.386 1.792 2.079 0.607
IC_IT 0.868 0.693 0.693 1.099 0.577
Panel C: Determinants of IC personnel
LNASSET 25.328 24.432 25.050 25.926 1.327
LNEMP 5.403 4.595 5.283 6.014 1.159
RD 0.014 0 0.002 0.014 0.028
EXPORT 0.277 0.006 0.129 0.510 0.311
FOR_CURR 0.065 0.002 0.024 0.087 0.099
LNPROD 1.554 1.386 1.609 1.792 0.289
INV_AR 0.297 0.178 0.284 0.402 0.156
LNAGE 3.084 2.565 3.135 3.584 0.615
LEVERAGE 0.415 0.256 0.416 0.561 0.199
ZSCORE 3.670 1.784 2.751 4.267 3.677
LOSS 0.281 0 0 1 0.449
GROWTH 0.090 0.041 0.061 0.199 0.308
CHAEBOL 0.112 0 0 0 0.316
LARGEST 0.336 0.202 0.324 0.456 0.178
FOROWN 0.069 0.001 0.010 0.084 0.118
KOSDAQ 0.604 0 1 1 0.489
N 4477 4477 4477 4477 4477
This table provides descriptive statistics by the number of IC personnel in each department, by the natural logarithm of the number of IC
personnel in each department and by the determinants of IC personnel. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values.
IC_N_TOTAL1 = Number of the IC personnel in the accounting, ﬁnance, ITS and other departments in the ﬁrm;
IC_N_TOTAL2 = Number of the IC personnel in the accounting, ﬁnance and ITS departments in the ﬁrm;
IC_N_ACC = Number of the IC personnel in the accounting department in the ﬁrm;
IC_N_FIN = Number of the IC personnel in the ﬁnance department in the ﬁrm;
IC_N_ACCFIN = Number of the IC personnel in the accounting and ﬁnance departments in the ﬁrm;
IC_N_IT = Number of the IC personnel in the ITS department in the ﬁrm;
IC_TOTAL1 = The natural logarithm of the number of IC personnel in the accounting, ﬁnance, ITS and other departments in the ﬁrm;
IC_TOTAL2 = The natural logarithm of the number of IC personnel in the accounting, ﬁnance and ITS departments in the ﬁrm;
IC_ACC = The natural logarithm of the number of IC personnel in the accounting department in the ﬁrm;
IC_FIN = The natural logarithm of the number of IC personnel in the ﬁnance department in the ﬁrm;
IC_ACCFIN = The natural logarithm of the number of IC personnel in the accounting and ﬁnance departments in the ﬁrm;
IC_IT = The natural logarithm of the number of IC personnel in the ITS department in the ﬁrm;
All other variables are as deﬁned in Table 1.
176 J.-H. Choi et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 6 (2013) 167–185and 99% values to remove the potential inﬂuence of outliers. In all regression speciﬁcations, we include industry
and year indicator variables to control for industry ﬁxed eﬀects and year ﬁxed eﬀects.5. Sample and data
5.1. Data collection
The data on the number of employees in the internal control function for accounting, ﬁnance, ITS and
other departments are hand-collected for the period 2005–2008. An example of the excerpt from the ﬁnancial
statement of Samsung SDI Co. is presented in the Appendix. We take the information presented in the ﬁnan-
cial statement of each ﬁrm and construct our variables of interest from this information.
While the information on IC personnel ﬁrst became available in 2002, the enforcement of the release of such
information became eﬀective beginning in 2005. Due to reliability issues, we use the sample period from 2005
to 2008. We collect data on the ﬁnancial variables from the KIS-VALUE database.11 Corporate governance
variables are hand-collected from annual reports for the period 2005–2008. We include all ﬁrms listed on the
KSE and KOSDAQ market for which ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁnancial, corporate governance and internal control-
related data are available. Firms in ﬁnancial, real-estate and utilities industries are excluded. We exclude hold-
ing companies from our sample to control for diﬀerences in the corporate structure. This yields a sample of
1352 listed ﬁrms and 4477 ﬁrm-year observations.5.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables employed in our analyses for testing H1. Panel A
of Table 2 reports the mean, Q1, median, Q3 and standard deviation of the number of IC personnel for the
entire ﬁrm and for individual departments. The mean number of employees working for accounting depart-
ments (IC_N_ACC), ﬁnance departments (IC_N_FIN) and ITS departments (IC_N_IT) are 4.82, 2.14 and
2.09, respectively. The mean number of employees engaged in all internal control-related departments (IC_N_-
TOTAL1) is 10.68, which indicates that the average IC personnel in each ﬁrm is approximately 11. Panel B of
Table 2 lists the natural logarithm of the number of IC personnel in each department. In our tests, we use the
log-transformed ﬁgure of IC personnel to measure proportionate eﬀects of the determinants on IC personnel.
The mean of the natural logarithm of the number of employees working for accounting departments
(IC_ACC), ﬁnance departments (IC_FIN) and ITS departments (IC_IT) are 1.47, 0.94 and 0.87, respectively.
The mean of the log-transformed total number of employees in all internal control-related departments is 2.15.
Panel C of Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the sixteen determinants of IC personnel, which are
included in our regressions. The interpretation on the statistics of the factors that inﬂuence IC personnel is as
follows. First, the average size of the sample ﬁrms (LNASSET) is 25.33, which is translated to approximately
US$84 million. The natural logarithm of the number of employees of our sample ﬁrm is 5.40, which is equiv-
alent to 662 employees. The proxies which capture complexity are research and development expenses (RD),
amount of exports (EXPORT), assets denominated in foreign currencies (FOR_CURR) which represents the
signiﬁcance of foreign operations, the natural logarithm of the number of products of a ﬁrm (LNPROD) and
the sum of inventory and accounts receivable (INV_AR). The mean of the variables which capture complexity
of business activities and operations are 0.01, 0.28, 0.07, 1.55 and 0.30 for RD, EXPORT, FOR_CURR,
LNPROD and INV_AR, respectively. The average number of products that a ﬁrm produces is around
3.91. The natural logarithm of age of a ﬁrm is 3.08, which is equivalent to 25.04 years since its founding.
The variables that are intended to capture ﬁnancial distress are LEVERAGE, ZSCORE and LOSS, which
have mean values of 0.42, 3.67 and 0.28, respectively. The average growth rate of our sample ﬁrms is 0.09.
The mean of the indicator variable CHAEBOL suggests that 11.2% of our sample is composed of Chaebol-
aﬃliated ﬁrms. Two variables which represent the level of corporate governance are LARGEST and11 KIS-VALUE is equivalent to the COMPUSTAT database used for US data and contains ﬁnancial statement information. KIS-
VALUE receives its data from the Korean Information Service (KIS), which is the largest credit rating agency in Korea.
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mean of the indicator variable KOSDAQ indicates that 60.4% of our sample is composed of ﬁrms listed on
KOSDAQ.6. Empirical results
6.1. Univariate analyses
Table 3 presents the pairwise Pearson correlations between the total number of employees in the internal con-
trol-related departments and the determinants of IC personnel.12 The results indicate that size, measured by
total assets and the number of employees of a ﬁrm, are positively associated with IC personnel, consistent with
our expectation. There are mixed results for the variables which capture the complexity of a ﬁrm. As the need for
an eﬀective internal control system increases for complex ﬁrms, we ﬁnd EXPORT and LNPROD to have a posi-
tive correlation with IC personnel. However, other proxies of complexity such as RD, FOR_CURR and
INV_AR, appear to have an inverse relationship with IC personnel. We further examine this issue in the mul-
tivariate analyses below. Furthermore, experience of a ﬁrm (LNAGE) has a positive eﬀect on IC personnel. As
for proxies that capture ﬁnancial distress, two of the three variables, ZSCORE and LOSS, are negatively asso-
ciated with IC personnel, consistent with our prediction that ﬁnancial distress prevents a ﬁrm from investing in
its internal control system. The variable GROWTH is not signiﬁcantly related to the internal control systems of
ﬁrms. There is also preliminary evidence that Chaebol-aﬃliated ﬁrms are more likely to have a larger number of
IC personnel. Also, high levels of ownership of the largest shareholder and foreign investors are generally asso-
ciated with high levels of IC personnel. Finally, KOSDAQﬁrms are likely to have fewer number of IC personnel.
In general, our univariate results are consistent with our hypotheses and predictions outlined in Section 3.
However, it is likely that there are multicollinearity issues as evidenced by the signiﬁcant correlation between
variables LNASSET and LNEMP of 0.831.13 Also, the proxies for complexity are signiﬁcantly correlated with
each other. For example, the correlations between RD and EXPORT and between RD and FOR_CURR are
0.064 and 0.068, respectively, which are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The eﬀect of each of the factors can be val-
idated after controlling for other factors that may aﬀect IC personnel individually or jointly. As a next stage,
we re-examine the important determinants of internal control systems using multivariate regression models.6.2. Multivariate analyses
Table 4 presents the regression results of Eq. (1), which examines the determinants of IC personnel with
IC_TOTAL1 and IC_TOTAL2. In the ﬁrst column of Table 4, we employ IC_TOTAL1 as the dependent var-
iable, while, in the second column, we use IC_TOTAL2 as the dependent variable. The two variables are sim-
ilar in that they capture the natural logarithm of the number of employees from all departments engaged in
internal control functions, except that IC_TOTAL2 omits “other” departments.14 The adjusted R2 in Table 4
is 42.7% and 45.3% for the regression models using IC_TOTAL1 and IC_TOTAL2, respectively. The explan-
atory power is signiﬁcantly high in both models.
Table 5 reports the results of Eq. (1), using the number of IC personnel for each department (accounting,
ﬁnance, sum of accounting and ﬁnance, ITS department) as the dependent variable. The adjusted R2 in Table 5
ranges from 15.1% to 43.7% for the four regression models. The explanatory power is high for regressions
which employ IC_ACC and IC_ACCFIN as the dependent variable, but relatively low for regressions which
employee IC_FIN and IC_IT as the dependent variable. The weak results are likely to be caused by low
cross-sectional diﬀerences in the number of employees for the ﬁnance and ITS departments in internal control
(see Panel A of Table 2). The overall results based on Tables 4 and 5 suggest that the coeﬃcients on at least ﬁve12 We do not report the correlations with IC_TOTAL2, IC_ACC, IC_FIN, IC_ACCFIN and IC_IT in Table 3 for simplicity purposes.
They are generally similar to the correlations for IC_TOTAL1.
13 To remove the potential eﬀect of the high correlation between LNASSET and LNEMP, we perform analyses with Eq. (1) but without
LNEMP (LNASSET). The empirical results are qualitatively the same and, thus, not separately displayed.
14 See footnote 4 for the deﬁnition of other departments.
Table 3
Pairwise Pearson correlations.
IC_TOTAL1 LNASSET LNEMP RD EXPORT FOR_CURR LNPROD INV_AR LNAGE
IC_TOTAL1 1.0000
LNASSET 0.6215* 1.0000
LNEMP 0.5994* 0.8310* 1.0000
RD 0.0757* 0.1364* 0.0910* 1.0000
EXPORT 0.0674* 0.1241* 0.1359* 0.0638* 1.0000
FOR_CURR 0.0064 0.0395* 0.0295* 0.0684* 0.5647* 1.0000
LNPROD 0.0593* 0.0728* 0.1202* 0.0160 0.0417* 0.0500* 1.0000
INV_AR 0.0431* 0.1327* 0.0032 0.1149* 0.0172 0.2043* 0.0867* 1.0000
LNAGE 0.2776* 0.4358* 0.3668* 0.2566* 0.0381* 0.1358* 0.0588* 0.0459* 1.0000
LEVERAGE 0.1235* 0.1950* 0.1925* 0.1832* 0.0439* 0.0568* 0.0077 0.1785* 0.1567*
ZSCORE 0.0945* 0.1667* 0.1284* 0.1631* 0.0175 0.0154 0.0011 0.0650* 0.2405*
LOSS 0.1698* 0.2254* 0.2480* 0.1446* 0.0335* 0.0368* 0.0671* 0.1427* 0.1176*
GROWTH 0.0039 0.0653* 0.0658* 0.1269* 0.0033 0.0155 0.0051 0.1853* 0.0406*
CHAEBOL 0.4211* 0.5687* 0.4772* 0.0907* 0.0375* 0.0896* 0.0305* 0.1323* 0.2005*
LARGEST 0.0519* 0.1203* 0.1187* 0.1397* 0.0710* 0.0851* 0.0197 0.0870* 0.1814*
FOROWN 0.3153* 0.4704* 0.4359* 0.0340* 0.0556* 0.0050 0.0135 0.1165* 0.1151*
KOSDAQ 0.3863* 0.5776* 0.4877* 0.1811* 0.0148 0.0753* 0.0738* 0.0144 0.5851*
LEVERAGE ZSCORE LOSS GROWTH CHAEBOL LARGEST FOROWN KOSDAQ
LEVERAGE 1.0000
ZSCORE 0.5850* 1.0000
LOSS 0.1851* 0.1820* 1.0000
GROWTH 0.1094* 0.0361* 0.2312* 1.0000
CHAEBOL 0.1204* 0.0642* 0.1195* 0.0274 1.0000
LARGEST 0.0582* 0.0208 0.1926* 0.0494* 0.1218* 1.0000
FOROWN 0.0832* 0.1184* 0.1612* 0.0141 0.2292* 0.0152 1.0000
KOSDAQ 0.1222* 0.1786* 0.1603* 0.0335* 0.2867* 0.1427* 0.2637* 1.0000
This table provides pairwise Pearson correlations between the variables used in the multivariate analysis. The deﬁnitions of the variables
are presented in Tables 1 and 2.
All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values.
* Denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
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direction and are statistically signiﬁcant. We provide interpretations of the results for each aspect of factors
that inﬂuence IC personnel below.6.2.1. Firm size and IC personnel
Results from both Tables 4 and 5 conﬁrm the signiﬁcant role played by ﬁrm size. The two variables which
represent the size of a ﬁrm, LNASSET and LNEMP, are positively associated with IC personnel, for both the
whole ﬁrm as well as the individual departments (IC_TOTAL1, IC_TOTAL2, IC_ACC, IC_ACCFIN) at less
than 1% levels. For example, when IC_TOTAL1 is used as a dependent variable, the coeﬃcients on LNASSET
and LNEMP are 0.155 (t-value = 6.61) and 0.149 (t-value = 7.00), respectively, in Table 4. This ﬁnding is
consistent with prior studies that report the overall positive association between ﬁrm size and internal control
quality (Ge and McVay, 2005; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007; Doyle et al., 2007a). This evidence conﬁrms the
argument that the resources and infrastructure within large ﬁrms allow them to invest in hiring more qualiﬁed
internal control personnel which will ensure adequate policies and procedures to be in place. The statistical
signiﬁcance of size on IC personnel is weaker or disappears when IC_FIN or IC_IT are used as the dependent
variable in Table 5. It is likely that the low variability across the numbers of IC personnel within ﬁnance (mean
value of 2 employees) and ITS departments (mean value of 2 employees) is a cause for the weak results.6.2.2. Complexity and IC personnel
Examining the ﬁve variables for complexity, only one variable, FOR_CURR, is statistically signiﬁcant in
explaining IC personnel. The coeﬃcient on FOR_CURR is signiﬁcant at the 10% level when IC_TOTAL1,
Table 4
Results of determinants of IC personnel using the natural logarithm of total number of IC personnel.
Variable Predicted IC_TOTAL1 IC_TOTAL2
Intercept 2.527*** 2.620***
(4.60) (5.00)
LNASSET + 0.155*** 0.149***
(6.61) (6.75)
LNEMP + 0.149*** 0.158***
(7.00) (7.67)
RD + 0.222 0.003
(0.52) (0.01)
EXPORT + 0.078 0.043
(1.51) (0.87)
FOR_CURR + 0.239* 0.243*
(1.72) (1.83)
LNPROD + 0.001 0.024
(0.02) (0.58)
INV_AR + 0.09 0.083
(1.06) (1.06)
LNAGE + 0.006 0.006
(0.18) (0.23)
LEVERAGE – 0.039 0.013
(0.53) (0.18)
ZSCORE – 0.001 0.001
(0.49) (0.25)
LOSS – 0.028 0.028
(1.21) (1.29)
GROWTH – 0.072** 0.073***
(2.56) (2.89)
CHAEBOL + 0.202*** 0.202***
(3.45) (3.71)
LARGEST ± 0.109 0.116*
(1.52) (1.69)
FOROWN ± 0.051 0.055
(0.35) (0.40)
KOSDAQ ± 0.049 0.042
(1.32) (1.18)
Year eﬀects Included Included
Industry eﬀects Included Included
N 4477 4477
Adj. R2 0.427 0.453
* Denote signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Denote signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Denote signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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IC_TOTAL1 is used as the dependent variable, the coeﬃcient on FOR_CURR is 0.239 (t-value = 1.72).
The positive association suggests that as the complexity of ﬁrms’ activities and operations increases, proxied
by the signiﬁcance of foreign operations (FOR_CURR), it increases the need for eﬀective internal controls,
thus resulting in a high number of IC personnel. Signiﬁcant foreign operations indicate the possibility that
a ﬁrm is aﬀected by diﬀerent institutional and legal environments in which it operates in. The exposure to dif-
ferent environments makes it more diﬃcult to implement adequate internal controls in place, which in turn,
increases the demand for eﬀective internal control systems. The positive coeﬃcient on the variable FOR_-
CURR conﬁrms this relationship. While the statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient on FOR_CURR disap-
pears when IC_FIN and IC_ACCFIN are used as the dependent variable, the sign is directionally
consistent in all analyses.
Table 5
Results of determinants of IC personnel using the natural logarithm of number of IC personnel by department.
Variable Predicted IC_ACC IC_FIN IC_ACCFIN IC_IT
Intercept 2.926*** 2.279*** 2.997*** 1.173**
(5.52) (3.46) (5.68) (2.00)
LNASSET + 0.141*** 0.119*** 0.161*** 0.051**
(6.36) (4.31) (7.23) (2.13)
LNEMP + 0.153*** 0.028 0.133*** 0.131***
(7.78) (1.14) (6.80) (5.08)
RD + 0.005 0.206 0.093 0.158
(0.01) (0.51) (0.25) (0.34)
EXPORT + 0.056 0.057 0.068 0.040
(1.12) (1.04) (1.42) (0.71)
FOR_CURR + 0.220* 0.129 0.201 0.308**
(1.68) (0.86) (1.52) (2.06)
LNPROD + 0.050 0.029 0.024 0.002
(1.23) (0.64) (0.61) (0.06)
INV_AR + 0.010 0.171* 0.096 0.014
(0.13) (1.77) (1.22) (0.17)
LNAGE + 0.010 0.015 0.000 0.018
(0.35) (0.48) (0.01) (0.62)
LEVERAGE – 0.018 0.111 0.017 0.034
(0.25) (1.27) (0.24) (0.42)
ZSCORE – 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002
(0.51) (0.56) (0.11) (0.67)
LOSS – 0.028 0.037 0.033 0.009
(1.25) (1.48) (1.51) (0.40)
GROWTH – 0.059** 0.070** 0.076*** 0.039
(2.40) (2.41) (2.93) (1.53)
CHAEBOL + 0.198*** 0.159** 0.213*** 0.063
(3.64) (2.31) (3.97) (1.01)
LARGEST ± 0.144** 0.041 0.134* 0.023
(2.02) (0.52) (1.96) (0.30)
FOROWN ± 0.025 0.080 0.003 0.192
(0.18) (0.55) (0.02) (1.25)
KOSDAQ ± 0.051 0.007 0.032 0.051
(1.42) (0.17) (0.90) (1.35)
Year eﬀects Included Included Included Included
Industry eﬀects Included Included Included Included
N 4477 4477 4477 4477
Adj. R2 0.420 0.151 0.437 0.201
This table reports analysis of the determinants of IC personnel. To adjust for heteroskedasticity, standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm-
level.
Robust t-statistics are in brackets.
All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% values.
The deﬁnitions of the variables are presented in Tables 1 and 2.
* Denote signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Denote signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Denote signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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In Tables 4 and 5, neither the age of a ﬁrm nor the ﬁnancial distress of a ﬁrm appears to have a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the number of IC personnel, although they are signiﬁcantly correlated with IC_TOTAL1 in the uni-
variate analyses as reported in Table 3. Other determinants of IC personnel may have subsumed the eﬀect of
experience and ﬁnancial performance on the investment in the internal control systems of a ﬁrm.
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Next, growth of a ﬁrm has a negative eﬀect on the number of IC personnel at the 5% level. The coeﬃcient on
GROWTH is statistically signiﬁcant at the whole ﬁrm (IC_TOTAL1 and IC_TOTAL2) as well as individual
department levels, except for the ITS department. For example, when IC_TOTAL1 is used as the dependent var-
iable, the coeﬃcient onGROWTH is0.072 (t-value = 2.56). This is consistent with the argument made byKrish-
nan (2005) and Doyle et al. (2007a) who suggest that rapidly growingly ﬁrms outgrow their internal control
systems. It is likely that the lack of (human) resources, processes and less advanced techniques hinder ﬁrms in
maintaining adequate internal controls and making investments in human resources in internal control functions.
6.2.5. Business group aﬃliation and IC personnel
The coeﬃcient on the variable CHAEBOL is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level in Table 4. For example,
when IC_TOTAL1 is used as the dependent variable, the coeﬃcient on CHAEBOL is 0.202 (t-value = 3.45),
indicating the strong inﬂuence of business group aﬃliation on IC personnel at the whole ﬁrm level. We ﬁnd
consistent evidence at the individual department level, except for the ITS department. Prior work investigating
the characteristics of Chaebols indicates that Chaebols are generally larger in size, more proﬁtable and more
capable of making investments (Kim, 2012). The positive coeﬃcients on CHAEBOL across diﬀerent speciﬁ-
cations reinforces this ﬁnding by suggesting that the larger capacity borne by Chaebol-aﬃliated ﬁrms enables
them to make relatively bigger investments in information systems and internal control functions.
6.2.6. Corporate governance and IC personnel
Examining the corporate governance variables, there is a marginally signiﬁcant eﬀect of the ownership of
the largest shareholder on IC personnel. The coeﬃcient on LARGEST is signiﬁcant at the 10% level when
IC_TOTAL2, IC_ACC and IC_ACCFIN are used as the dependent variable. For example, when IC_TOTAL2
is used as the test variable, the coeﬃcient on LARGEST is 0.116 (t-value = 1.69) in Table 4. The other
corporate governance variable, FOROWN is not statistically signiﬁcant in any speciﬁcation. The negative
association documented between corporate governance and IC personnel is potentially due to the substitutive
eﬀect of internal control systems. Concentrated ownership by the owners facilitates the monitoring process
and incentivizes them to closely oversee management and to enforce changes when necessary. Firms with good
monitoring mechanisms have a reduced need for eﬀective internal control systems, resulting in a lower number
of IC personnel. The substitution eﬀect is an explanation for the inverse relation between LARGEST and the
number of IC personnel.15
Finally, whether or not the ﬁrm is listed on KOSDAQ does not have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
number of IC personnel.
Overall, both our univariate and multivariate analyses support our hypotheses in Section 3. We ﬁnd that
the number of IC personnel is relatively higher for ﬁrms with bigger size in terms of total assets and the num-
ber of employees, ﬁrms with complexity and for Chaebol-aﬃliated ﬁrms, however, the number of IC personnel
is relatively lower for growth ﬁrms. These ﬁndings suggest that ﬁrms with greater capacity and established
infrastructure tend to invest more in human resources in internal control departments. In contrast, ﬁrms
are hesitant to invest heavily in their internal control systems in the face of a lack of resources, and/or a rap-
idly changing business environment. The analyses based on the results from Tables 4 and 5 presents moder-
ately signiﬁcant implications that corporate governance and internal control systems are substitutes.
Speciﬁcally, a strong corporate governance structure within a ﬁrm weakens the need for a high quality internal
control system, thus leading to a lower number of IC personnel.6.3. Additional test
Table 6 provides the results of regression Eq. (2) in which the indicator variable, LARGE, which partitions
ﬁrms with relatively large size, and the interactive terms with the indicator variable are included. The objective15 Alternatively, it may be possible that ﬁrms with concentrated ownership avoid the investment in IC personnel to pursue private beneﬁts
at the expense of minority shareholders. However, this alternative explanation is less likely to occur in the current strong legal environment
after the implementation of K-SOX.
Table 6
The eﬀect of ﬁrm size on the determinants of IC personnel.
IC_TOTAL1 IC_TOTAL2
Variable Coeﬀ. t-stat Coeﬀ. t-stat
Intercept 0.783 1.33 0.810 1.37
LNASSET 0.089*** 3.56 0.086*** 3.44
LNEMP 0.091*** 3.75 0.090*** 3.87
RD 0.023 0.05 0.491 1.23
EXPORT 0.034 0.66 0.000 0.00
FOR_CURR 0.071 0.47 0.104 0.75
LNPROD 0.010 0.22 0.016 0.37
INV_AR 0.175* 1.92 0.152* 1.84
LNAGE 0.036 1.38 0.004 0.18
LEVERAGE 0.103 1.31 0.054 0.73
ZSCORE 0.004 1.28 0.002 0.91
LOSS 0.020 0.80 0.016 0.70
GROWTH 0.015 0.53 0.004 0.15
CHAEBOL 0.151 1.08 0.149 1.03
LARGEST 0.146** 2.10 0.165** 2.53
FOROWN 0.293* 1.82 0.309* 1.81
KOSDAQ 0.051 1.09 0.055 1.24
LARGE 2.803** 2.56 2.947*** 2.84
LARGE * LNASSET 0.106** 2.30 0.101** 2.36
LARGE * LNEMP 0.084** 2.23 0.100*** 2.74
LARGE * RD 0.215 0.21 0.877 0.89
LARGE * EXPORT 0.095 1.03 0.090 1.02
LARGE * FOR_CURR 0.456* 1.80 0.415* 1.76
LARGE * LNPROD 0.030 0.38 0.018 0.24
LARGE * INV_AR 0.077 0.47 0.029 0.19
LARGE * LNAGE 0.070 1.21 0.008 0.16
LARGE * LEVERAGE 0.118 0.79 0.070 0.51
LARGE * ZSCORE 0.002 0.22 0.002 0.24
LARGE * LOSS 0.120*** 2.76 0.115*** 2.74
LARGE * GROWTH 0.194*** 3.20 0.146*** 2.70
LARGE * CHAEBOL 0.325** 2.13 0.320** 2.07
LARGE * LARGEST 0.348*** 2.67 0.380*** 3.06
LARGE * FOROWN 0.398* 1.66 0.407* 1.71
LARGE * KOSDAQ 0.028 0.40 0.004 0.06
Year eﬀects Included Included Included Included
Industry eﬀects Included Included Included Included
N 4477 4477
Adj. R2 0.442 0.471
This table reports analysis of the determinants of IC personnel.
To adjust for heteroskedasticity, standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm-level. Robust t-statistics are presented under the t-stat column.
All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% values.
The deﬁnitions of the variables are presented in Tables 1 and 2.
* Denote signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Denote signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Denote signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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prevalent. The results of Table 6 suggest that the eﬀect of the determinants of IC personnel is pronounced
among ﬁrms with relatively larger size (LNASSET). The signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on the interaction terms
between the LARGE indicator variable and the determinants indicate that the eﬀect of the factors known
to inﬂuence internal control systems increase with ﬁrm size. Speciﬁcally, in Table 6, we ﬁnd that the interaction
terms with LNASSET, LNEMP, FOR_CURR, LOSS, GROWTH, CHAEBOL, LARGEST and FOROWN
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on LNASSET is 0.089 (t-value = 3.56) and that on LARGE*LNASSET is 0.106 (t-value = 2.30) in Table 6.
The results imply that small ﬁrm size inﬂuences the number of IC personnel (logged value) by 0.089 (the coef-
ﬁcient on LNASSET), while large ﬁrm size inﬂuences the number of IC personnel (logged value) by 0.195 (the
sum of 0.089 and 0.106). Speciﬁcally, characteristics including ﬁrm size, complexity and business group aﬃl-
iation have a larger positive eﬀect on IC personnel for ﬁrms with relatively bigger size (in terms of the natural
logarithm of total assets). Large ﬁrms experiencing a loss make relatively lower levels of investments in human
resources in internal controls. Additionally, the positive eﬀect of business group aﬃliation on internal control
systems is prevalent for large ﬁrms. Finally, the substitutive eﬀect of internal control functions and corporate
governance is accentuated in large ﬁrms. In summary, factors such as ﬁrm size, complexity of business envi-
ronment and operations, ﬁnancial distress, growth, business group aﬃliation and corporate governance struc-
ture have a larger eﬀect on IC personnel for ﬁrms with relatively large total assets.17
7. Conclusion
This paper investigates the characteristics of ﬁrms that induce ﬁrms to make investments in human
resources in internal controls. Using unique ﬁrm-level data on the number of employees engaged in the inter-
nal control functions both at the whole ﬁrm and individual department levels, we are able to identify the types
of ﬁrms which implement adequate internal control systems. Prior studies investigating the factors that expose
ﬁrms to internal control risks generally ﬁnd that such ﬁrms are smaller, younger, ﬁnancially troubled, more
complex, growing rapidly or undergoing restructuring (Ge and McVay, 2005; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007;
Doyle et al., 2007a). Extending this line of research, this study aims to understand the major factors which
determine human resource investment in internal controls within a ﬁrm. Importantly, the literature attributes
material weaknesses in internal controls to the following: lack of training, deﬁciencies in adequate processes
and procedures, lack of segregation of duties and inappropriate account reconciliation (Ge and McVay, 2005).
The root problem can be signiﬁcantly alleviated by having “qualiﬁed accounting staﬀ” which is directly related
to our main variable of interest, IC personnel.
Following guidance from prior literature, we examine the determinants of the internal control system of a
ﬁrm in eight aspects: size, business complexity, age, ﬁnancial distress, growth, business group, corporate gov-
ernance and type of exchange market. Our results suggest that high quality internal control systems are more
likely for ﬁrms that are larger both in terms of total assets and number of employees, more complex, less rap-
idly growing and for Chaebol-aﬃliated ﬁrms. However, other factors including age, ﬁnancial distress or the
type of exchange market do not seem to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the quality of internal control systems.
The ﬁndings suggest that ﬁrms with suﬃcient resources and established infrastructure (e.g., large ﬁrms, Chae-
bols) have the capability to invest in their internal control systems while growth ﬁrms struggle with their ﬁnan-
cial reporting controls in the face of a lack of resources and a changing business environment. Additional
analysis reveals the accentuated eﬀect of ﬁrm characteristics on IC personnel among larger ﬁrms.
While our ﬁndings provide valuable insights, the ﬁndings may be subject to certain caveats. First, it is lar-
gely a descriptive study which focuses on association, rather than causation. We cannot rule out the possibility
that unobserved factors that are correlated with both ﬁrm characteristics and IC personnel may drive the
results. Second, although the regulations in Korea on internal controls are similar to those in the US or other
developed countries, the results may not be generalizable to other countries due to diﬀerences in regulatory
environments. However, this paper oﬀers valuable insights to policymakers, practitioners and academics as
the results demonstrate the important characteristics of ﬁrms which adopt high quality internal control
systems.16 Note that the coeﬃcients on LOSS, LARGEST and FOROWN are mostly insigniﬁcant in Tables 4 and 5. The signiﬁcant interaction
terms on these variables in Table 6 suggest that these variables inﬂuence the number of IC personnel only in large ﬁrms.
17 Note that we do not tabulate the results for individual departments in Table 6 for simplicity purposes. The untabulated results are
generally similar to the tabulated results.
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The following table shows the disclosure of SDI Co., Ltd. on IC personnel for the ﬁscal year ending Decem-
ber 31, 2008. This information is contained in the “Report on the operation of internal control systems,”
which is a part of the ﬁrm’s annual report. The ﬁrst column shows the number of employees working in each
department and the second column reports the number of employees who are in charge of the task for the
implementation of internal controls in each department. The third column shows how many CPAs are work-
ing in each department. In the case of Samsung Engineering Co., Ltd., one of the board members is a CPA.
The fourth column shows the ratio of CPA to the number of IC personnel. The last column presents the aver-
age work experience of IC personnel in months.Department r Total
employeess IC
personnelt
CPAsu Ratio of CPAs v Average
Experience
of IC personnel(A) (B) (B/A100) (in months)
Audit (Committee) 3 3 – – 101
Board of Directors 7 2 – – 76
Accounting 39 35 1 2.9% 117
Finance 5 5 – – 52
ITS 36 1 – – 156
Others 45 2 – – 38References
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